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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae First Amendment Law Professors have expertise in First
Amendment doctrine and its intersection with new technologies, including social
media companies. Amici have authored many articles and opinion pieces analyzing
the application of First Amendment principles to the Internet.
Amici write to assist the Court by providing important context for the
constitutional analysis of S.B. 7072. S.B. 7072 implicates multiple doctrinal areas,
both constitutional and statutory, and its First Amendment deficiencies are obvious.
Amici specifically write to highlight how S.B. 7072 impermissibly regulates social
media platforms’ editorial discretion — long treated as First Amendment protected
speech by the Supreme Court. S.B. 7072 cannot pass constitutional scrutiny because,
amongst other failings, it constitutes state management of private entities’ content
policies, a type of editorial discretion that social media companies enjoy. The district
court thus properly enjoined the law’s enforcement, and this court should affirm the
district court’s ruling.

SUMMARY
In 2021, Florida enacted S.B. 7072, a law regulating large social media
companies and their content policies. Among other provisions, S.B. 7072 prevents
social media companies from removing political candidates from their services;
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prohibits regulated social media companies’ use of “post-prioritization or shadow
banning algorithms”; prohibits “censorship” of “journalistic enterprises” by social
media companies; and creates an exception for social media companies operated by
companies that own theme parks within the state. Fla. Stat. § 501.2041.
S.B. 7072 presents a panoply of constitutional and statutory issues; two trade
associations filed a pre-enforcement challenge to the law, successfully obtaining a
preliminary injunction. Florida now appeals, arguing that the law satisfies
constitutional scrutiny and is not preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 230, which immunizes
interactive community services from almost all liability and preempts contrary state
law. For a number of reasons explained by appellees and other amici, Florida’s
claims must fail.
Specifically, Amici First Amendment Law Professors argue that S.B. 7072
unconstitutionally infringes social media platforms’ editorial discretion. S.B. 7072
does not present a difficult or novel question: it infringes on core editorial discretion
rights, and thus core speech rights. S.B. 7072 crudely mandates content choices by
private entities: a classic First Amendment violation that cannot satisfy strict
scrutiny, and would be unlikely to satisfy even less stringent First Amendment
review.
Amici contend that Florida’s justifications for S.B. 7072 fail to comport with
long-settled First Amendment doctrine. Though the state has attempted to reconcile
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S.B. 7072 with the Supreme Court’s precedents, its theory flies in the face of clearly
established doctrinal principles. Whatever Florida’s policy goals were in enacting
S.B. 7072, the law’s constitutional infirmities are blatant and irreparable. S.B. 7072,
facially deficient as it is, cannot satisfy constitutional scrutiny. Thus, this court
should uphold the district court’s injunction.

ARGUMENT
I.
The First Amendment Protects Editorial Discretion, Which S.B. 7072
Impermissibly Regulates.
A.
Social Media Platforms Have First Amendment Protection for
Content Policy Decisions, Which Requires a Strict Scrutiny Analysis.
S.B. 7072 constitutes an extreme and unconstitutional effort by Florida to
regulate the speech practices of a private entity — precisely the type of governmental
action the First Amendment disfavors, as it amounts to state management of private
platforms’ editorial discretion. Such management unconstitutionally regulates
platform speech.
For nearly fifty years, courts have held that private entities such as newspapers
have First Amendment rights in their choices regarding what content to publish,
often referred to as editorial discretion. In overturning a Florida “right of reply”
statute governing newspapers, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Miami Herald v.
Tornillo:

3
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The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of
public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time.
Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). Lower courts have ratified
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tornillo, including as applied to newspaper
advertising. See, e.g., Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 518 (4th Cir.
2019) (“Maryland’s law ‘intru[des] into the function of editors’ and forces news
publishers to speak in a way they would not otherwise… the First Amendment
applies in full force to all ‘news, comment, and advertising.’”) (internal citations
omitted); Memphis Pub. Co. v. Leech, 539 F.Supp. 405, 411 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (“[A
Tennessee statute] therefore violates the First Amendment by intruding
impermissibly into the editorial discretion involved in accepting and preparing the
copy for commercial advertising.”).
Tornillo’s holding extends to Internet companies. The Supreme Court held in
Reno v. ACLU that the historical and technical justifications for radio and broadcast
regulation do not apply to the Internet. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
844, 869 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.”). Subsequent cases
expanded the strict scrutiny analysis to the analogous context of content-based

4
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Internet regulations; since 2004 courts have required that the government
demonstrate that it has a compelling interest, that the regulation is narrowly tailored,
and that it is the least restrictive means of regulating content. See, e.g. Ashcroft v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 665–66 (2004).
Because S.B. 7072 regulates content in the form of social media platforms’
editorial discretion, and because social media platforms are not subject to a more
deferential standard of review than other media, it must satisfy strict scrutiny as a
content-based restriction. As appellee observes, it cannot. Brief of Appellee at 31–
46, NetChoice v. Moody, No. 21-12355 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2021).
B.

S.B. 7072 Impermissibly Interferes with Editorial Discretion

Amici emphasize how S.B. 7072, in its regulations of platform content
policies, impermissibly regulates editorial discretion. The district court properly
analyzed existing Supreme Court cases that appellant and appellee proffered by
holding that S.B. 7072 burdened social media platforms’ speech, though it
improperly emphasized an “invisible-to-the-provider” argument irrelevant to the
analysis.
As the district court correctly observed, multiple Supreme Court cases —
Tornillo, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California,
and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston —
demonstrate why the government cannot seek to “balance the discussion” on private
5
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social media platforms. These three cases emphasize that the government cannot
create mandates regulating private entities engaging in First Amendment-covered
editorial discretion. Tornillo, as discussed supra, concerned a Florida statute that
interfered with the editorial choices of newspapers. PG&E and Hurley show that the
principles of editorial discretion extend to “less-traditional” media or settings such
as envelopes and parades. While social media companies are most properly
compared to newspapers, PG&E and Hurley demonstrate how editorial discretion
rights apply in a variety of settings.
In PG&E, the Supreme Court held that a mandated right of access to “extra
space” within a privately-owned utility company’s billing envelopes violated the
First Amendment rights of the company to choose what messages it disseminated.
In his controlling plurality opinion, Justice Powell noted “Compelled access like that
ordered in this case both penalizes the expression of particular points of view and
forces speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they do not set.” Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ca., 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986). Importantly,
Pacific Gas & Electric noted that the Tornillo rule applied to situations that did not
involve the “institutional press.” Id. at 11 (“The concerns that caused us to invalidate
the compelled access rule in Tornillo apply to appellant as well as to the institutional
press.”). Put simply, because the regulation required PG&E to “associate with

6
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speech with which [it] may disagree,” it was impermissible and triggered strict
scrutiny. Id. at 15.
Hurley addressed a type of editorial discretion in a venue even further afield
from the regulation of newspapers in Tornillo: a regulation requiring that parade
organizers include a group they disagreed with in their parade. The Supreme Court
noted that the parade operator “had no written criteria” for inclusion and “did not
generally inquire into the specific messages or views” of participants. Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 562 (1995).
Despite this comparatively minor editorial effort, the Court recognized a protected
speech right in the operator’s choices about which messages to include or exclude.
The parade’s heterogeneity and general (though not absolute) openness to marchers
was irrelevant: “[A] private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply
by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an
exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.” Id. at 569–70.
Moreover, the fact that participants in a parade have distinct messages from
the parade itself is of no consequence to the First Amendment protections afforded
to the parade organizers’ choice to exclude. Id. at 570 (“Nor, under our precedent,
does First Amendment protection require a speaker to generate, as an original matter,
each item featured in the communication.”). Explaining this point, the Hurley court
drew a direct comparison to Tornillo and newspaper editorial pages, which often run

7
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editorials from contributors and receive protection for their editorial discretion. Id.
(“[T]he presentation of an edited compilation of speech generated by other persons
is a staple of most newspapers' opinion pages, which, of course, fall squarely within
the core of First Amendment security.... The selection of contingents to make a
parade is entitled to similar protection.”) (internal citations omitted).
Taken together, Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley set forth some underlying
principles governing First Amendment protection of editorial discretion. First,
private entities — including non-traditional modes of media — that choose to
exclude other voices retain First Amendment protection. The state cannot force
private entities to carry or host content contrary to their desired message. Second,
the private entity need not create the content it hosts to receive First Amendment
protection, and the content it hosts can be multifaceted, diverse, and potentially even
contrary to the stated preferences of the entity (as when a newspaper prints a letter
to the editor criticizing the paper’s editorial perspective). Third, a regulation that
requires a private entity to carry unwanted commentary cannot survive merely
because the private entity can “respond” to that which it would otherwise decline to
publish. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 16 (“[F]orced response is antithetical
to the free discussion that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”)
S.B. 7072 flatly violates all these principles. It requires social media platforms
to host users it disagrees with; manages the methods by which a platform can display

8
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and rank content; and prevents platforms from labeling user speech that it disagrees
with. Effectively, Florida has taken its unconstitutional Tornillo statute and added
even more blatantly unconstitutional provisions. Since Reno, the Supreme Court has
analogized First Amendment regulation of the Internet to regulation of newspapers,
and that analogy remains the most apt comparison in this case. In its unbridled,
excessive interference with private parties’ editorial discretion, S.B. 7072 violates
First Amendment freedoms; the district court thus properly enjoined the law’s
enforcement.
C.

The District Court’s “Invisible to the Provider” Analysis Is Irrelevant
Though the district court correctly determined that social media platforms’

editorial discretion receives First Amendment protection and that S.B. 7072
unconstitutionally interferes with such discretion, it incorrectly employed an
“invisible to the provider” standard in its analysis. Amici urge this court to disregard
that component of the district court’s analysis, as it introduced unnecessary and
irrelevant complexity into a straightforward question: whether social media
platforms exercise constitutionally protected editorial discretion. Editorial
operations can take a variety of forms across different types of media, and the
constitutional

protections

for

editorial

implementation.
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discretion

apply

regardless
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The district court observed that this case presents issues distinct from Tornillo,
PG&E, and Hurley because social media companies present content that may be
“invisible to the provider.” Despite this, the district court still determined that S.B.
7072 regulates speech, not conduct, and was thus subject to First Amendment
scrutiny. NetChoice v. Moody, No. 21-cv-220-MAF, 2021 WL 2690876, *7–9 (N.D.
Fla. June 30, 2021). The district court then properly applied strict scrutiny to S.B.
7072 as a content-based restriction, finding that it failed that test.
Because the “invisible to the provider” construction proved immaterial to the
district court’s strict scrutiny analysis, and because of its lack of connection to
existing doctrine, this court need not employ that element in upholding the district
court’s ruling that S.B. 7072 regulates content by regulating editorial discretion.
None of the relevant cases (Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley) reference such a factor.
Indeed, the record in Hurley suggested that the messages espoused by potential
parade participants were similarly obscure to the operator. Whether the private party
exercising editorial control saw all the content it published or approved was
irrelevant to the Supreme Court’s analysis in each of the cases. The Supreme Court
has never equated editorial review with editorial discretion in finding the latter
protected by the First Amendment. Similarly, no court has held that a content
provider must preclear third-party content to establish First Amendment protection
for its editorial discretion. Even if such preclearance or “visibility” were necessary,

10
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it could be circumvented (as in a parade). The visibility or certainty of what a hosted
speaker says, or will say, is thus irrelevant in determining whether a platform
exercises editorial discretion rights.
Whether the district court meant to imply that an “invisible to the provider”
analysis was relevant to finding that social media platforms’ editorial discretion was
protected speech, such an analysis creates an irrelevant variable inconsistent with
existing caselaw. As the “invisible to the provider” frame finds no antecedent in First
Amendment doctrine, and unnecessarily complicates the legal analysis, this court
should disregard it in finding that social media platforms’ editorial discretion
receives First Amendment protection.

II.
The State’s Construction of First Amendment Doctrine Ignores Key
Doctrinal Tenets
A.

Florida Misconstrues Relevant Case Law on Editorial Discretion

At the district court and now in this court, Florida constantly insists that S.B.
7072 regulates conduct, not speech, and that Supreme Court precedent justifies its
choices to regulate social media providers. The district court correctly rejected these
arguments, though Florida continues to proffer them in this appeal. Florida’s view
of the editorial discretion rights of social media platforms is unnecessarily cramped,
and the state misconstrues all relevant Supreme Court cases in its quest to save S.B.
7072.
11
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Florida unjustifiably limits the nature of editorial discretion rights in order to
squeeze S.B. 7072 into constitutionality. In its appeal, Florida claims that S.B.
7072’s mandates do not interfere with editorial discretion because the principles
underlying Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley do not apply to social media platforms.
Opening Brief of Appellant at 20–34, NetChoice v. Moody, No. 21-12355 (11th Cir.
Sept. 7, 2021). Florida reasons that S.B. 7072 complies with the First Amendment
because platforms can still speak in opposition to “must-carry” speech; their users
are unlikely to be confused by the speech S.B. 7072 forces platforms to carry; and
the platforms fail to offer a “unified” speech product. Id. at 24–33. Regardless of the
accuracy of these arguments, they are irrelevant for the purposes of considering
editorial discretion.
Florida misconstrues Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley by selectively interpreting
those cases to assert that a platform that fails to promulgate a “unified speech
product,” has unlimited space to rebut mandated speech, and can avoid consumer
confusion can be regulated as the state as attempted to do here. In attempting to
establish the “unified speech product” claim, Florida cites Hurley to argue that a
social media company, as it only consists of “individual, unrelated segments that
happen to be transmitted together,” does not receive the same type of treatment as
Hurley. Id. at 30. By quoting language from Hurley referencing Turner Broadcasting

12

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 17 of 25

System v. FCC, Florida implicitly argues that S.B. 7072 should be compared to the
cable television regulations upheld by the Court in Turner. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576.
There are multiple failures with this argument. First, the regulations in Turner
were held to be content-neutral (warranting intermediate scrutiny); while S.B. 7072,
despite Florida’s protestations, is clearly content-based. As the district court
correctly described, S.B. 7072 is “about as content-based as it gets.” NetChoice at
*10. Turner applied intermediate scrutiny, a more deferential analysis than what the
court must apply in this case.
Second, nothing in the Turner plurality opinion suggests that cable operators’
editorial speech interests were diminished because cable carries individual, unrelated
segments. The referenced discussion in Turner concerned the degree to which the
content-neutral regulations in that case would force cable operators to “alter their
own messages” — a change that clearly is contemplated by S.B. 7072’s contentbased provisions. Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 655–56 (1994).
Lastly, social media platforms’ editorial discretion cannot be properly
described as “individual, unrelated segments that happen to be transmitted together.”
Social media platforms develop extensive content moderation policies and
guidelines to govern what types of content they allow and disallow, with wide
variations in those policies. It is precisely these policies which Florida seeks to
override. The platforms make choices about what content to publish and present to

13
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their users based on the specific audience they hope to reach, and those audiences
vary widely just as there are differences among newspapers and periodicals.
Facebook, for example, has much stricter provisions surrounding nudity than
Twitter, just as The Nation chooses different content than the Wall Street Journal.
Platforms use content moderation policies to shape what kinds of content they
host on their platform in much the same way as a newspaper chooses freelance
pieces, letters to the editor, and advertisements. And merely because the content on
social media companies might contradict the company’s own speech preferences, or
other user-generated content, does not mean that the company itself lacks protection;
as the court noted in Hurley, “a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes
to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech. Hurley at
569–570. Hurley itself thus undercuts the “unified speech product” argument by
acknowledging the diversity of views within a setting that retains editorial discretion.
Florida’s contention that the statutes in Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley only
apply in situations in which the private entity lacks infinite space to host content and
distance itself from the mandated content that they disagree with also lacks merit.
Indeed, the state’s argument is difficult to reconcile with Turner, which expressly
declined to apply any scarcity-based rationale, noting that there soon may be “no
practical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the cable medium.”

14
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Turner at 638. Under Florida’s logic, the state could enact a statute identical to the
one at issue in Tornillo but only have it apply to the Miami Herald’s website, rather
than its physical edition. Because MiamiHerald.com theoretically could host
unlimited content, there would be no issue under this theory in mandating that the
Herald’s website carry editorial content it disagreed with. Of course, such a result
would be patently absurd and contravene Tornillo. Even social media providers have
some physical limitations in the content they can host; they cannot extend infinitely
onto the horizon and incur significant operational costs.
Finally, Florida argues that because users of social media platforms are
unlikely to confuse the speech S.B. 7072 mandates platforms carry, interference with
the platforms’ speech rights is constitutional. In making this assertion, Florida cites
to PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins and Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights which, as discussed infra Part II.B, are inapposite to this case.
Florida can find no grounding for this assertion in Tornillo, PG&E, or Hurley; those
cases do not reference potential confusion as relevant to the contours of protected
editorial discretion.
S.B. 7072 also limits the ability for platforms to actually label speech that it
disagrees with; the statute limits a platform’s ability to “censor” user content, which
includes “posting an addendum to any content or material posted by a user.”
§501.2041(b); see §501.2041(2)(a),(b),(d), (j). If a platform cannot necessarily post

15
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addenda to user speech it disagrees with under the statute, its ability to prevent
consumer confusion is a dead letter. Florida’s insistence that platforms can reduce
the possibility that a user might conflate mandated content with its own preferences
thus rings hollow.

B.

FAIR and PruneYard are Inapposite

Florida relies upon two cases — PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins and
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights — to prop up its claims
that S.B. 7072 appropriately regulates private entities. These cases, one concerning
a shopping mall and the other concerning law schools, are easily distinguishable
from the current case and bear no relevance in analyzing the constitutionality of S.B.
7072.
PruneYard upheld the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
California Constitution’s free speech clause as allowing for an affirmative right for
speakers to enter a private shopping mall to distribute political materials (despite the
shopping mall’s opposition) as not conflicting with the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court held that because Tornillo addressed a statute that was an “intrusion
into the function of editors” — a factor not present in PruneYard, in which the mall
could hardly be said to have any kind of editorial perspective — it did not apply.
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (internal citations
omitted). The PruneYard analysis is irrelevant in this case because, as discussed
16
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supra, platforms do have an editorial perspective in their content moderation policies
and in the enforcement of such policies. No one would establish a shopping mall for
the purposes of hosting speakers, just as no one would establish a social media
platform without considering what type of content to host.
Florida’s reliance on other statements from PruneYard — that the mall was
free to dissociate itself from the activists, that no speech was compelled by the mall,
and that the activists’ message was unlikely to confuse mall customers — are
irrelevant. Social media platforms (unlike the PruneYard mall) do have an editorial
perspective. Moreover, as discussed supra, S.B. 7072 interferes with private entities’
ability to speak and to label mandated content, and social media platforms could not
speak out against the mandated speech under the law.
Florida’s reliance on Rumsfeld v. FAIR is also misguided, because the law
challenged there — the Solomon Amendment, which required law schools to host
military employers to receive federal funding — governed entities that lacked
editorial discretion. Law schools’ speech rights in hosting employers are quite
different from social media platforms which, again, primarily exist to make choices
about what types of content to host. Whatever editorial discretion rights a law school
may have, they do not attach to the presence of potential employers for their students.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006)
(“[A]ccommodating the military's message does not affect the law schools' speech,

17

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 22 of 25

because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting
receptions…. A law school's recruiting services lack the expressive quality of a
parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page of a newspaper”). In FAIR, the Court held
that what distinguished that case from Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley was that in those
cases “the complaining speaker's own message was affected by the speech it was
forced to accommodate.” Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 63. That was not true for the
institutions in FAIR, but is true in this case for the foregoing reasons.
Florida has tried valiantly to equate social media platforms with malls and law
schools, but the most obvious comparison has always been to newspapers and thus
to Tornillo and its progeny. As the Supreme Court observed in Reno v. ACLU, the
Internet is much more readily compared to historical media like newspapers and
pamphlets. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (“This dynamic, multifaceted category of
communication includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio,
video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue.”). This court
should follow that precedent in finding that Tornillo controls in defining the nature
of social media platforms’ editorial discretion.

CONCLUSION
Nearly fifty years after Tornillo, Florida has once again attempted to defend a
statute that interferes with the speech rights of private parties. As in that historic
case, the statute at issue here is so flagrantly unconstitutional as to defeat any of
18
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Florida’s weak and incorrect explanations. Florida may fear or resent private
companies’ ability to regulate speech. But it cannot interfere with private entities’
First Amendment rights to address whatever social problems it seeks to solve. S.B.
7072 constitutes an unprecedented and excessive overreach into private entities’
editorial discretion rights, and the district court properly enjoined its enforcement to
protect those rights. This court should thus affirm the judgment of the district court.
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